Hasina’s conviction for crimes against humanity is testing India-Bangladesh ties

For India, few friendships have been as strategically valuable and politically costly as its long-standing embrace of former Bangladeshi leader Sheikh Hasina.

During her 15 years in power, she delivered what Delhi valued most in its neighborhood: stability, connectivity and neighbors willing to align their interests with India rather than China.

These days she is crossing the Indian border, but sentenced to death She was charged with crimes against humanity by a special court in Bangladesh for suppressing student-led protests, leading to her deportation.

Demonstrations in 2024 forced her to flee and paved the way for Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus to lead an interim government. The election will be held early next year.

The fallout from all this creates a diplomatic dilemma: Dhaka wants Hasina extradited, but Delhi has shown no willingness to comply — making her execution effectively impossible to carry out.

The humanitarian asylum that Delhi had intended to offer is turning into a long and uncomfortable test of how far it is willing to go for its old ally and how much diplomatic capital it is prepared to expend in the process.

South Asia expert Michael Kugelman said India faces four unattractive options.

It could hand over Hasina – “which it really doesn’t want to do”. It could maintain the status quo, although “this will become increasingly dangerous for Delhi once the newly elected government takes office next year”.

Alternatively, it could force Hasina to remain silent and avoid statement or interviewShe is “unlikely to accept” this while she continues to lead the Awami League party, and Delhi is unlikely to enforce it.

The remaining option is to find a third country to host her, but that is also worrisome: few governments are willing to accept “a demanding guest with serious legal issues and security needs,” Mr. Kugelman said.

Extraditing Hasina – considered a close friend by both India’s ruling party and the opposition – is unthinkable. “India prides itself on not attacking its friends,” Kugelman said.

What makes this moment particularly awkward for Delhi is the depth and asymmetry of the India-Bangladesh relationship, which has its roots in India’s key role in the birth of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia, and India has become Bangladesh’s largest export market in Asia. With trade totaling nearly $13bn (£10bn) last year, Bangladesh runs a sizable deficit and is heavily dependent on India for raw materials, energy and transit routes.

India has provided $8 billion to $10 billion in concessional credit over the past decade, provided duty-free access to some goods, built cross-border rail lines and supplied electricity as well as oil and liquefied natural gas from Indian grids and ports. This is not a relationship that either party can easily walk away from.

Sanjay Bhardwaj, professor of South Asian studies at Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University, said: “India and Bangladesh have a complex interdependence and depend on each other for water, electricity and other aspects. Without India’s cooperation, it will be difficult for Bangladesh to function.”

However, many believe that Bangladesh’s interim government under Yunus now appears to be moving quickly to rebalance its foreign relations. Political scientist Bian Sai said in a report that his first few months in office were marked by a series of diplomatic activities aimed at “de-Indianizing” Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Paper Published by the National University of Singapore.

A government that once aligned itself with India in every regional forum is now canceling judicial exchanges, renegotiating Indian energy deals, slowing down Indian-led connectivity projects and openly relying on Beijing, Islamabad and even Ankara for strategic partnerships. For many, the message couldn’t be clearer: Bangladesh, once India’s most reliable neighbor, is now struggling to hedge.

The deterioration in public sentiment is already evident. the latest one opinion poll The survey by the Dhaka-based Center for Alternatives found that more than 75% of Bangladeshis view relations with Beijing positively, compared with just 11% in Delhi, reflecting sentiment after last year’s uprising. Many accuse Delhi of supporting an increasingly authoritarian Hasina in her final years and view India as an overbearing neighbor.

Professor Bharadwaj said long-term economic and cultural ties often transcend political shifts: data show trade between India and Bangladesh increased between 2001 and 2006, when the “less friendly” Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was in power in coalition with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI).

“While diplomatic and political relations often fluctuate with changes in governments, economic, cultural and sporting relations tend to remain largely stable. Even if a new government is less friendly to India, it will not automatically disrupt trade or broader bilateral relations,” he said.

For Delhi, the challenge is not only to manage an ally in exile but to protect neighbors vital to its security – from counterterrorism and border management to access to the restive northeast. Experts say India has a porous 4,096-kilometer (2,545-mile) border with Bangladesh that runs partly along a river, and domestic unrest could trigger displacement or the mobilization of extremists.

“India should not be in a hurry,” said Avinash Paliwal, who teaches politics and international studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. He argued that the way forward required “quiet, patient engagement with key political stakeholders in Dhaka – including the armed forces”. Diplomacy buys time.

Dr Paliwal believes that relations between the two countries are likely to remain volatile over the next 12 to 18 months, with the intensity depending on developments in Bangladesh after next year’s elections.

“If the interim government is able to credibly complete the election and the elected government accepts the charges, it may provide options for both parties to renegotiate relations and limit the damage.”

This uncertainty has New Delhi having to consider not just immediate tactical actions but broader principles: How can India assure friendly governments that it will support them “through thick and thin” without inviting accusations that it is shielding leaders with troubling human rights records?

“There is no silver bullet operational solution to this dilemma. Perhaps the deeper question that needs thoughtful consideration is why India faces this dilemma in the first place,” Dr Paliwal said. In other words, by supporting Hasina so consistently, is Delhi putting too many eggs in one basket?

“Anyone you deal with who is in power is friendly and helps you get your job done. Why would you want to change that?” said Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, India’s former high commissioner to Bangladesh. “Foreign policy is not driven by public perception or morality – relations between countries rarely are.

“Internally, we have no control over Bangladesh’s politics – it is fractious, deeply divided and built on fragile institutions.”

Whether India can repair deeper political ruptures remains uncertain. In the meantime, much depends on the next government in Bangladesh. “The key will be the extent to which the next government in Bangladesh allows the Hasina factor to affect the bilateral relationship. If it essentially holds the relationship hostage, moving forward will be difficult,” Mr Kugelman said.

Ultimately, he said, the next elected government will need to balance Bangladesh’s core interests – border security, trade and connectivity – with domestic politics and public anti-India sentiment.

“I don’t foresee a serious crisis in the relationship, but I suspect they will remain fragile at best.”